Taxation-Federal Income Tax-Divocrce Property Settlement as a Taxable Event by Dickinson, Martin B., Jr., S.Ed.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 61 Issue 3 
1963 
Taxation-Federal Income Tax-Divocrce Property Settlement as a 
Taxable Event 
Martin B. Dickinson Jr., S.Ed. 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Family Law Commons, Taxation-Federal Estate and Gift Commons, and the Tax Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Martin B. Dickinson Jr., S.Ed., Taxation-Federal Income Tax-Divocrce Property Settlement as a Taxable 
Event, 61 MICH. L. REV. 612 (1963). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol61/iss3/12 
 
This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law 
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, 
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
612 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
TAXATION-FEDERAL INCOME TAX-DIVORCE PROPERTY SETILEMENT AS 
A TAXABLE EVENT-Respondent taxpayer transferred stock to his former 
wife pursuant to a voluntary property settlement agreement incorporated 
in their divorce decree. As consideration for the securities conveyed, his 
wife released her rights to alimony, dower, and intestate succession under 
Delaware law.1 The Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed as tax-
able gain the difference between the taxpayer's basis for the stock and 
its market value at the time of the transfer, but the Court of Claims ruled 
that the taxpayer realized no taxable gain from the transfer.2 On certiorari, 
held, reversed.3 The exchange was a taxable event in which the taxpayer 
received property equivalent in value to the market worth of the securities 
transferred. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962). 
The transfer of appreciated property pursuant to a divorce property 
settlement presents peculiar interpretative difficulties. Since the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1954 provides that appreciation in the value of property 
shall be taxed only upon its "sale or other disposition,"4 the first question 
presented in the principal case was whether the transfer of property inci-
dent to a settlement agreement constitutes such a "sale or other disposition" 
and a consequent realization of economic gain or loss to the transferor 
1 See DEL. CoDE .ANN. tit. 12, §§ 502, 901, 904, 905; tit. 13, § 1531 (1953); DEL. CoDE 
ANN. tit. 12, § 512 (Supp. 1960). 
2 Davis v. United States, 287 F.2d 168 (Ct. Cl. 1961). 
3 The Court in the same opinion affirmed the holding of the Court of Claims that 
the taxpayer's payment of his wife's legal expenses in connection with the tax aspects 
of the divorce was not deductible under § 212(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. 
Principal case at 74. 
4 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1001. 
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within the meaning of section IOOI(a).5 In such a property settlement the 
wife ordinarily releases her inchoate alimony, dower, and succession rights 
in return for an agreed consideration from the husband.6 Assuming the 
consideration to have a fixed value as agreed upon by the parties, the 
husband receives the benefit of gain embodied in appreciated property, at 
least within the technical requirements of the Code, when he uses it to 
satisfy his settlement obligation, just as surely as if he sold that property 
and used the sale proceeds to satisfy the agreed obligation.7 His wife, 
however, is concerned only with the total value of the property transferred 
to her; she derives no added benefit from the property she receives simply 
because its value at the time of the exchange exceeds its basis to her 
husband. While her marital rights constitute the basis of her bargaining 
position in the settlement negotiations and ordinarily bear an approximate 
relationship to the size of her husband's estate,S the specific property which 
she actually receives is designated in the agreement between husband and 
wife.9 Assuming that the wife's bargaining position enables her to com-
mand a certain dollar amount in the settlement negotiations, it is of no 
concern to her whether she receives appreciated or depreciated property 
in satisfaction of her husband's obligation. It would be purely coincidental 
if the proportion of appreciation embodied in the property the wife in 
fact receives were equivalent to the proportionate growth in her settle-
ment share by reason of capital accretions to her husband's estate. Such 
an analysis confirms the technical soundness of the established interpre-
tation, followed by the principal case, that a transfer of appreciated prop-
erty in a divorce settlement constitutes a realization of gain to the transferor 
and is therefore a taxable event to him.10 
Measurement of the husband's taxable gain from the transfer pre-
sented a more difficult problem in the principal case. Section IOOl(b) of 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 measures the amount realized from a 
"sale or other disposition" as "the sum of any money received plus the 
fair market value of the property (other than money) received." The 
II "The gain from the sale or other disposition of property shall be the excess of 
the amount realized therefrom over the adjusted basis provided in section 1011 for 
determining gain, and the loss shall be the excess of the adjusted basis provided in such 
section for determining loss over the amount realized." 
6 See 1 NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT § 13.07 (2d ed. 1945). 
7 Cf. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Kenan v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 217 
(2d Cir. 1940). 
s See l AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.18 (Casner ed. 1952): 2 NELSON, DIVORCE AND 
ANNULMENT § 14.42 (2d ed. 1961 rev.). 
9 See Commissioner v. Halliwell, 131 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 
741 (1943); 1 NELSON, op. cit. supra note 6, § 13.31. 
10 Commissioner v. Halliwell, supra note 9; Commissioner v. Mesta, 123 F.2d 986 
(3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 695 (1942); E. Eugene King, 31 T.C. 108 (1958); Cris-
tina de Bourbon Patino, 13 T.C. 816 (1949), afj'd, 186 F.2d 962 (4th Cir. 1950). Accord, 
Aleda N. Hall, 9 T.C. 53 (1947); Rev. Rul. 57-507, 1957-2 CUM. BULL. 511. Contra, 
Commissioner v. Marshman, 279 F.2d 27 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 918 (1960); 
Zimmers v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 903 (W.D. Ky. 1961). See also Rev. Rul. 59-47, 
1959-1 CUM. BULL. 198; Rev. Rul. 57-506, 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 65. 
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Board of Tax Appeals, in early cases dealing with property settlements, 
found it impossible to determine the fair market value11 of the property 
received by the husband, i.e., the wife's released alimony, dower, and suc-
cession rights; it therefore declined to tax the husband.12 The Courts of 
Appeals for the Second and Third Circuits reversed these decisions and 
assigned to the property received by the husband a value equivalent to 
that of the property transferred by him.13 This view prevailed14 until 
the original holding of the Board of Tax Appeals was revived by the 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Commissioner v. Marshman,15 
which was cited as controlling by the lower court in the principal case.16 
The Marshman decision returned to an outmoded view of section IOOI(b) 
that prohibited t~ation of capital gain at the time of the exchange if 
no fair market value could be assigned directly to the property received.17 
More recent cases, however, have presumed an equal exchange and have 
assigned to the property received a value equivalent to that of the prop-
erty transferred where the latter has a re?-dily ascertainable market value 
and an "arm's-length" transaction is involved.18 Although most modern 
decisions have viewed a divorce property settlement as an arm's-length 
11 "[F]air market value means the price at which a willing buyer and a willing seller 
would arrive, after negotiation for sale, where neither is acting under compulsion." In rt: 
Estate of Williams, 256 F.2d 217, 218 (9th Cir. 1958). 
12 Walter S. Halliwell, 44 B.T .A. 740 (1941); L. W. Mesta, 42 B.T.A. 933 (1940). 
13 Commissioner v. Halliwell, 131 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 741 
(1943); Commisioner v. Mesta, 123 F.2d 986 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 695 
(1942). 
14 E. Eugene King, 31 T.C. 108 (1958); Cristina de Bourbon Patino, 13 T.C. 816 
(1949), afj'd, 186 F.2d 962 (4th Cir. 1950). Accord, Aleda N. Hall, 9 T.C. 53 (1947). 
15 279 F.2d 27 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 918 (1960). 
16 Davis v. United States, 287 F.2d 168, 174 (Ct. Cl. 1961). See Zimmers v. United 
States, 199 F. Supp. 903 (W.D. Ky. 1961). 
17 See Champlin v. Commissioner, 71 F.2d 23 (10th Cir. 1934); O'Meara v. Com-
missioner, 34 F.2d 390 (10th Cir. 1929). Section 202(b) of the Revenue Act of 1919 
encouraged reluctance to apply indirect valuation by providing that, in computing gain, 
the value of the thing received should "be treated as the equivalent of cash to the 
amount of its fair market value, if any." (Emphasis added.) Ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1060. An 
amendment in 1921 limited recognition of gain to instances where the property received 
had a "readily realizable market value." Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 202(c), 42 
Stat. 230. In 1924 Congress formulated the realization of gain provision as it now 
stands in § lOOl(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 
234, § 202(c), 43 Stat. 256. Courts now acknowledge that the congressional intent is 
to risk error in valuation rather than deny taxation entirely. See Helvering v. Safe 
Deposit & Trust Co., 316 U.S. 56 (1942); United States v. Ludey, 274 U.S. 295 (1927). 
Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-l(a) (1957), reinforces this policy by providing that "only in rare 
and extraordinary cases will property be considered to have no fair market value." 
1s E.g., United States v. General Shoe Corp., 282 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 
365 U.S. 843 (1961); International Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d !110 (2d 
Cir. 1943); Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 130 Ct. Cl. 166, 126 
F. Supp. 184 (1954); E. Eugene King, 31 T.C. 108 (1958). The Marshman holding does 
not necessarily repudiate this principle, since there was serious doubt as to the true 
value of the property transferred by the husband. 279 F.2d at 33. Where subsequent 
events will make certain the value of the property received, the imposition of tax 
liability may be deferred. E.g., Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931). 
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transaction unless the contrary is shown,19 Marshman held that negotia-
tions attended by the tensions that so often accompany marital discord 
could not be so described.20 In the principal case the Court recognized 
that a divorce settlement should be described, for tax purposes, as an 
arm's-length transaction; the Court therefore repudiated Marshman and 
valued the property received by the taxpayer as equivalent to the market 
price of the securities transferred by him. This course was at least tech-
nically correct and should achieve certainty where previously there was 
substantial doubt.21 Moreover, it seems dear that the discharge of a settle-
ment obligation does provide an excellent opportunity for many husbands 
to realize the entire benefit of appreciation embodied in their property. 
It may, therefore, seem inequitable as a matter of policy to allow such 
a realization event to go entirely untaxed while granting no such privilege 
to persons utilizing appreciated property for more conventional purposes. 
Nevertheless, because of other, undesirable consequences, congressional 
action altering the tax treatment of property settlements, as established 
by the principal case, should be seriously considered. The most objection-
able aspect of the present law is that it produces a highly unfortunate dis-
parity of tax treatment between common-law and community-property 
jurisdictions. While an equal division of community property goes un-
taxed,22 an equal division of the husband's property in a common-law 
jurisdiction can produce a staggering tax liability. Congress has acted 
on numerous occasions to eliminate such inequalities of tax treatment 
arising from differences between the property law in common-law and 
community-property jurisdictions,23 and should do so in this context. 
Even within each property system the present Code produces unfor-
tunate anomalies. The choice of husband and wife as to whether their 
property is to be owned jointly or severally is often a matter of whim or 
caprice; the accident of the form and incidents of their ownership may 
be little indication of the way the parties view their rights. Yet, when 
unexpected marital discord develops, the tax liability of the parties may 
depend in large measure on the accident of title. Although no cases have 
dealt with the point, most writers suggest that an equal division of prop-
erty held by spouses in joint tenancy, like an equal division of community 
10 See Commissioner v. Halliwell, 131 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 
741 (1943); Commissioner v. Mesta, 123 F.2d 986 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 695 
(1942); E. Eugene King, supra note 18; Cristina de Bourbon Patino, 13 T.C. 816 (1949), 
aff'd, 186 F.2d 962 (4th Cir. 1950). 
20 279 F.2d at 32. 
21 The principal case has been cited as controlling by Robert K. Stephens, 38 T.C. 
345 (1962). 
22 E.g., Swanson v. Wiseman, CCH 1961 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (61-1 U.S. Tax Cas.) 
11 9264 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 23, 1961); Ann Y. Oliver, 18 P-H Tax Ct. Mero. 347 (1949); 
Frances R. Walz, 32 B.T.A. 718 (1935). Transfers other than equal divisions are taxed 
as in the principal case. E.g., Long v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 471 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
338 U.S. BIB (1949); Johnson v. United States, 135 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1943); Jessie Lee 
Edwards, 22 T.C. 65 (1954). Accord, Rouse v. Commissioner, 159 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1947). 
23 Sec, e.g., INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2(a), 2056(c), 2523(f). 
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property, would be treated as a non-taxable event.24 In contrast, an 
equal division of property held in the husband's name alone could impose 
a huge liability on him. Indeed, the present treatment of property settle-
ments can pose an insoluble dilemma for a husband whose assets, for in-
stance, consist largely of greatly-appreciated stock in a close corporation. 
Transfer of such shares pursuant to a settlement agreement would give 
rise to a massive tax liability while the husband would receive nothing 
tangible-only the release of the wife's marital rights. Yet the husband 
might well wish to avoid sale of his remaining shares for fear of losing his 
voice in corporate matters. The harshness of the present law in this situ-
ation is compounded by the effect the impending tax liability may have 
on the settlement negotiations, for the husband's situation may be so 
desperate that the wife can extract inordinate concessions in return for any 
action by her that would allow the husband to retain the control repre-
sented by his stock.2° 
Finally, the present treatment of property settlements will inevitably 
present administrative difficulties. In two older cases dealing with the 
wife's basis for property received in a settlement the Tax Court accepted 
a figure set by the parties as the amount of the obligation discharged by 
the transfer of property, although the agreed figure was greater than the 
fair market value of the property actually transferred.26 The converse of 
this approach would allow parties to a settlement to shift part of the 
husband's capital gain liability to the wife by setting the agreed obligation 
at a figure below the fair market value of the property used to discharge 
it. Since this result is fundamentally inconsistent with the rationale of 
the principal case and presents an extraordinary opportunity for manipu-
lation of tax liability, it is doubtful the Internal Revenue Service would 
countenance it.27 Nevertheless, the difficulty involved demonstrates that 
some aspects of the tax treatment of property settlements remain unsettled. 
The tax liability of the wife presents special problems, for it is not entirely 
clear, as a purely technical matter, why she should not be taxed on the 
gain in the value of her dower interest when she exchanges it for property 
from the husband in a divorce settlement. Taxation of the wife has been 
avoided in non-divorce settings only by prohibiting the husband who 
purchases release of his wife's dower interest from either adding the amount 
of the payment to the basis of his property or deducting it as an expense 
of defending or perfecting title.28 Such difficulties demonstrate that the 
24 See, e.g., CCH 1962 STAND. FED. TAX REP. ,I 4470.03; cf. Corfield v. Koehler, 207 
F. Supp. 73 (D. Kan. 1962). 
25 Just such a situation is described in Baer v. Commissioner, 196 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 
1952). 
26 Cristina de Bourbon Patino, 13 T.C. 816 (1949), non-acq., 1950-1 CuM. BULL, 7, 
aff'd, 186 F.2d 962 (4th Cir. 1950); Aleda N. Hall, 9 T.C. 53 (1947), acq., 1947-2 CuM. 
BULL. 2. 
27 The Commissioner's non-acquiescence in Cristina de Bourbon Patino, supra note 
26, should be noted. 
28 Illinois Nat'l Bank v. United States, 273 F.2d 231 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 
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present Code is simply not properly designed to deal with exchanges in-
volving marital rights. 
The magnitude of these problems suggests that a divorce property 
settlement is not an event appropriate for taxation of capital gain. The 
similarity of property settlements to other transactions which Congress has 
deemed inappropriate as taxable events reinforces this conclusion. As 
with an exchange in kind of property held for use in a trade or business 
or for investment,29 or a sale and purchase of principal residences,30 the 
transferor's gain in a settlement transfer does not take the form of property 
that could be used to make tax payments.31 Likewise, divorce transfers often 
share the characteristics of the involuntary conversions which Congress has 
found inappropriate as taxable events.32 
Congress could easily eliminate the harsh and inequitable effects of the 
present law, as applied in the principal case, by enacting a relatively 
simple nonrecognition provision.33 Such an amendment would provide 
that the gain realized from the transfer of appreciated property pursuant 
to a divorce or separation property settlement agreement would not be 
recognized for tax purposes. A carryover provision would assign to the 
transferee the transferor's basis for the property.34 An enactment of this 
sort would require no change in existing gift and estate tax law as applied 
to property settlements, for the operation of these chapters depends upon 
the nature and timing of the settlement agreement, and not upon the 
capital gain treatment of the property transferred.35 It would of course 
be necessary to limit operation of the nonrecognition provision to settle-
ment agreements entered into after the enactment of the new provision. 
Such a nonrecognition provision would merely postpone the payment of 
tax on the appreciation involved; because of the basis carryover provision 
363 U.S. 803 (1960):" O'Malley v. Yost, 186 F.2d 603, petition for rehearing denied, 189 
F.2d 331 (8th Cir. 1951); George M. LeCroy, 15 T.C. 143 (1950); Frank J. Digan, 35 B.T.A. 
256 (1937). Contra, Frank v. Commissioner, 51 F.2d 923 (3d Cir. 1931). 
20 See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1031. 
30 See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1034. 
31 The Internal Revenue Service has followed the same course in declining to tax 
the donor of a charitable contribution on appreciation embodied in the property he 
contributes. Rev. Rul. 55-410, 1955-1 CuM. BuLL. 297. Accord, Campbell v. Prothro, 209 
F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1954). 
32 See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1033. 
33 The American Law Institute, viewing property settlements as involuntary ex-
changes, has recommended such a provision. 1 ALI FED. INCOME TAX STAT. § X257 (Feb. 
1954 Draft). 
34 Since property acquired under a settlement agreement is ordinarily not considered 
a gift (see INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 2516), the basis carryover provisions of § 1015(a) 
would rarely apply, and a specific carryover provision would be necessary. Since the 
possibilities of avoidance are negligible, the transferor's basis should carry over regardless 
of whether it is greater or less than the fair market value at the time of the transfer. 
Section 362(a) applies a similar provision to corporate reorganizations. 
35 See Willan, Tax Aspects of Post-Death Marital Obligations, N.Y.U. 17TH INST. 
ON FED. TAX 12ll (1959); Note, Federal Tax Consequences in Divorce and Separation, 
7 UTAH L. R.Ev. 385 (1961). 
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no forgiveness of tax liability would be involved. The principal case itself 
recognizes that the problem is not one of whether the gain will be taxed, 
but of when. 
The principal benefit of such a nonrecognition provision would be 
equalization of treatment between common-law and community-property 
states. The relevant tax.able event would be the same in both cases-the 
sale or disposition of the appreciated property to a party outside the 
former marriage relationship. Equality would also be achieved within each 
property system, for the location of title would have no tax significance at 
the time of divorce. The parties could therefore distribute the property 
involved in a more appropriate fashion, without regard to tax conse-
quences which should properly be essentially extrinsic considerations. 
The appropriateness of the tax.able event would also be greatly en-
hanced by such a postponement of recognition. Gain would be taxed only 
on sale to an outsider, which in most cases would bring to the taxpayer 
liquid proceeds to defray the resulting tax liability. The inevitable result 
would be an amelioration of the weak bargaining position that the present 
law may impose on the husband. While the wife could demand more in 
the settlement negotiations because the tax liability would ultimately be 
imposed on her, the husband could satisfy that demand with an additional 
quantity of appreciated property; no tax would be due until further dis-
position of the property by the wife. Under the present law the tax must 
be paid immediately and in cash; the sale of appreciated securities to 
produce thiit cash only further multiplies the transferor's already sizable 
tax burden. In situations where corporate control is involved the husband 
could arrange for retention of voting rights of the stock transferred to 
his wife; under the present law some of that stock might have to be sold 
to outsiders to obtain cash with which to pay the tax. 
Because divorce has become an extremely common phenomenon in 
the United States-with one divorce occurring for every five marriages36-
Congress should seek to assure equality of treatment for all taxpayers in 
divorce circumstances. At the same time, however, Congress should insure 
against the dominance of arbitrary and artificial tax considerations in 
divorce negotiations. A nonrecognition provision eliminating the difficul-
ties demonstrated by the principal case would go far toward attainment 
of both of these goals. 
Martin B. Dickinson, Jr., S.Ed. 
86 Since 1950 the number of divorces in this country has averaged 375,000 yearly. 
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